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Abstract: What is the relationship between minorities and majorities within the
liberal constitutional order, and what role ought courts play in defining that
relationship? This paper approaches the question first by establishing a frame-
work of analysis which, drawing on work of David Hume, isolates three often
undervalued features of constitutional order: the idea of the constitution as a
going concern; the idea of the constitution as a complex whole; and the idea of
the constitution as a framework of moral sentiment. These themes are explored
in a study of contemporary British constitutional politics, an example of a stable
constitution in flux. Britain continues to struggle with the Human Rights Act and
the new prominence it accords to rights in constitutional debate. Reflecting on
this case study, the paper argues that, when it comes to thinking about con-
stitutional change, we should pay more attention to the imaginations of our
fellow citizens, and their limits, aiming to enlarge our moral horizons in a way
that aligns them with what is best within existing practices.
Keywords: constitutional order, moral sentiment, David Hume, human rights,
opinion
Introduction
The theme of minority accommodation and litigation calls for reflection on two
topics of central importance. The first is the relationship between minorities and
majorities within the liberal constitutional order, and thus the dynamics of
integration within a pre-existing and ongoing structure of self-rule. The second
is the role that courts play in such a relationship, and more broadly the place of
law within the organizational structure of the state. These two topics are impor-
tant to political and constitutional theorists but they are also germane to every-
day political discourse, lying at the heart of debates over multiculturalism,
immigration, and security politics, to name but a few.
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This paper approaches these questions skeptically. While it does suggest
some general conclusions, these are made tentatively. One reason for this
reluctance is that the conclusions draw largely upon an analysis of develop-
ments within British constitutional politics. There are limitations with an
approach that confines itself to a single jurisdiction. But it does mean that the
analysis can dig more deeply into the empirical data, which is important to an
enquiry that requires a sensitive reading of not just court cases but also to the
relationship between those cases and the political constitution. While Britain is
in some ways anomalous, in that it lacks a clear sense of the constitution as
higher-order law,1 in other respects it is quite ordinary. It is well-established –
new constitutions pose specific problems – and adopts both the principle of self-
rule and respect for law and fundamental rights.
The first section develops a framework for the analysis that follows. Drawing
on David Hume, it isolates three important but often undervalued features of
constitutional order. From Hume’s argument about the central role of conven-
tions in underpinning authority it draws, first, the idea of the constitution as a
going concern, something that predates us and is in the process of being con-
tinually made and remade through the practices of constitutional politics.
Second, it derives from the same source the idea of the constitution as complex
whole, whose institutions and structures interact reflexively in complicated and
even unpredictable ways. Third, it extracts from Hume’s claim that authority
rests ultimately in the opinion of the people the idea of the constitution as a
framework of moral sentiment. A constitution, that is to say, goes beyond
providing the ground rules of political order. It operates also as a dynamic
framework in which the opinions and sentiments of the people – what we
often call public reason – are channeled, structured, and brought to bear in
arguments over authority and liberty. It is through this process, theoretically
speaking, that authority is constituted and a diverse people makes itself a
public.
Constituting Authority
We often talk as though constitutions were static, institutional, and simple
things. A constitution, on this account, is something that exists mainly in and
for the present and has recognizable shape in terms of the institutional structure
it prescribes and the rules it is said to contain. By extension, a constitution is
1 But see, e. g., T.R.S. ALLAN, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LAW: FREEDOM, CONSTITUTION, AND
COMMON LAW (2013).
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seen as something we can and, when occasion arises, do fabricate. We see this
way of thinking not just in the obvious context of constitutional design,2 but also
in the more strongly analytical accounts of constitutional law3 and in a style of
comparative constitutional law that measures one jurisdiction’s institutional
apparatus and structure of rules against another’s.4 There may sometimes be
pedagogical or expository reasons for devising conceptual and juridical maps of
this sort. But we should be careful not equate such exercises with constitutional
reality.
Another way of looking at constitutions is to see them as diachronic, moral,
and complex structures. This perspective starts with what is arguably the central
feature of constitutional order: that it operates across time. A constitution is the
projection into a possible future of present sensibilities refracted through past
experience. Constitutions almost invariably preexist us. And so whether we like
it or not we enter a conversation that predates us and whose more important
terms and conditions are usually already well set. The conversation fundamen-
tally concerns who we are and how we got here. Or rather, the fact that we are
having this conversation in this way is a major part of what determines the
character of our association as citizens.
Arguments about identity naturally intersect with arguments about ruling –
about the way things are and ought to be run. Within a reasonably functional
constitution, these arguments will take the form of structured processes of
dialogue and exchange that tend to be channeled through established institu-
tional pathways. What might be called ‘nodal points’ occur at recognizable
places within this structure, where the actions of certain institutions, and
those of certain participants within them, typically carry additional force.
But debate is not restricted to such pathways and institutions. These are
essential to the conduct of government, no doubt, but not sufficient to the
moral exchange that surrounds and underpins government and which in
principle includes at least all those who are members of the political associa-
tion in question.
Constitutional rules and conventions emerge from this structure often in
complicated and unpredictable ways since the relationship between the various
institutions do not operate in strictly hierarchical terms. It is rarely the case that
2 For criticism of the application of this way of thinking even in that context, see Nehal Bhuta,
Against State-Building, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 517 (2008).
3 For a classic criticism of the canonical writings of the British jurist A.V. Dicey, see, e. g.,
MARTIN LOUGHLIN, PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY 146–49 (1992).
4 See, e. g., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN ASIA (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon
eds., 2014).
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one body speaks and the others fall into line. The communication between
institutions is usually more complicated. Multiplied, this patterned communica-
tion develops into a relatively dense network of reflexive relations. The sum of
these institutions, and the relevant sorts of interactions between them, may be
said to equate to the complex whole that is the constitution. The sum of the
more stable outputs of the relevant interactions may be said to equate to the
rules, principles, and conventions of the constitution. This process of internal
refraction takes place against a background of a wider and potentially commu-
nity-wide discourse that draws on and is responsive to what occurs within the
institutional structure of the polity. The contours of the conventions that emerge
are clarified or reinforced often by working against the image of another con-
stitutional structure, understood as different or even alien (just as the English
jurist Dicey articulated the British constitution against the example of the
French).5
This second model – of the constitution as a complex whole that has as its
heart an institutionally patterned moral conversation that takes place across the
domain of time – is not just sociologically more sophisticated. Its rival, juridical
and static, tends to depend on an authority derived from the idea of the social
contract – or its nearest practical equivalent, the foundational written constitu-
tional document. But the difficulties in this way of thinking about legitimacy are
familiar, having been pointed out at the philosophical level by Hume and at the
political level by Jefferson. Hume’s position is worth quoting because it lays
much of the basis for what follows later in the section:
Did one generation of men go off the state at once, and another succeed, as is the case with
silk-worms and butterflies, the new race, if they had sense enough to choose their
government, which surely is never the case with men, might voluntarily, and by general
consent, establish their own form of civil polity, without any regard to the laws or
precedents, which prevailed among their ancestors. But as human society is in perpetual
flux, one man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it, it is necessary, in
order to preserve stability in government, that the new brood should conform themselves
to the established constitution, and nearly follow the path which their fathers, treading in
the footsteps of theirs, had marked out to them.6
Consent cannot just be about an initial compact or founding moment. Either you
were a citizen at the time when the people were asked to consent to the new
constitution or you effectively cannot consent. If we want our constitution to be
a vehicle for self-rule, then that needs to be reflected in an ongoing and
5 A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION chs. 4 & 7 (J.W.F. Allison ed., 3d. ed. 2013).
6 David Hume, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 466–67
(Eugene F. Miller ed., 1985).
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constantly updating process of reflection, criticism, and reaffirmation of consti-
tutional rules and conventions. On this model institutions have to appeal to each
other – and through them to us – to something other than, or in addition to,
their conventional legal authority sourced in either a written constitutional
document or in historical practice. It cannot just be a matter of command and
control, or else allegiance threatens to degenerate into servitude. If a constitu-
tion is to guarantee political equality, it must contain mechanisms in which the
rights and duties of citizens are subject to constant adjustment. This perspective
changes the dynamics of consent, presenting the issue more in terms of an
ongoing conversation designed to test rules and conventions not just in the
abstract but, also in their application to particular contexts, individuals, and
groups. This in turn opens up possible answers to the problem of self-rule, since
it makes it possible to get closer to the ideal articulated for instance by con-
temporary republican writers who insist that any context in which a citizen is
subject to public power must be open to contestation.7 As this process of public
justification takes place along different pathways and forums, it opens up a
scenario in which every case decided by the courts, every legislative debate, and
every administrative act are in principle miniature constitutional moments, the
cumulative effect of which is to remake and refine the constitution on a daily
basis.
* * * * *
I turn to David Hume to help flesh out this schematic outline. Hume
provides the most insightful reading of the diachronic, moral, and complex
constitution within the British constitutional tradition.8 He wrote at a time of
immense change, both within a Europe turning away from the old gods and
towards the new world of commercial modernity, and also within a freshly
minted Britain – Scotland and England having formed Great Britain in 1707.
Hume was born in Edinburgh four years later, dying there in 1776, the year of
the American Declaration of Independence and Adam Smith’s Wealth of
Nations. While he saw the modern world as a vast improvement on previous
eras, Hume’s overriding message is one of continuity in social and political
life: “that almost all of what we enjoy in this world is an inheritance from others
who went before. Certainly most of the government that rules in any decent
7 PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1997).
8 Others within the tradition of British constitutional theory have written in a broadly similar
way, including Sir Mathew Hale, Adam Smith, Edmund Burke and John Stuart Mill as well as
Frederick Hayek and Michael Oakeshott. See THOMAS POOLE, REASON OF STATE: LAW,
PREROGATIVE AND EMPIRE ch. 8 (2015).
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nation is something handed down to us, and most of us must be well served –
even best served – if we keep it working well.”9
This insight grounds his theory of authority, which he saw as always
existing in an internal relation to liberty. In all governments “there is a perpetual
intestine struggle, open or secret, between AUTHORITY and LIBERTY; and
neither of them can ever absolutely prevail in the contest.”10 Government exists
to bring individuals’ short-term interests into line with everyone’s long-term
interest in an orderly society. But authority is not something legislated into
existence but rather something established over time, gradually cemented into
a people’s habits and customs. Hume deploys a narrative to explain how
structures of authority develop out of initially unpromising material. This is
his answer to Hobbes and Locke on the social contract. Political communities
usually begin in violence (usurpation or conquest) but rulers over time come to
appreciate the need for stability and continuity. This leads them into a relation-
ship with the people that goes beyond straightforward subjugation and which
engenders over time the constitution of political authority.11 This is constitu-
tional development patterned on the model of a sentimental education – or
Bildung – but it is an education that goes both ways, connecting rulers and ruled
in a process of mutual reflection through which they come to realize what is
valid and important within the claims of the other.
The arrival of constitutional authority is, thus, understood as a process of
civilization through which calm passions and deliberation gradually replace violent
passions and conflict.12 A central feature of that story is the move away from a
scenario dominated by our primary instincts to indulge ourselves in unlimited free-
dom or to seek equally unlimited dominion over others to onemediated by laws and
customs that aim to ensure that a balance exists between both. The development of
law, and the rule of law as an organizing principle, is vital. Law is the slowproduct of
order and of liberty. But once established it had a peculiar and independent staying
power– a “hardy plant,”Hume though, “whichwill scarcely ever perish through the
ill culture ofmen, or the rigour of the season”13–andas such exerts a stabilizing force
which helps to ‘lock in’ previous developmental gains.
9 RUSSELL HARDIN, DAVID HUME: MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORIST 99 (2007). (italics in the
original).
10 David Hume, Origin of Government, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY, supra note
6, at 40.
11 Id.
12 Compare STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY (1995).
13 David Hume, Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL
AND LITERARY, supra note 6, at 124.
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I want to draw three themes from Hume. The first is the constitution as
‘going concern’, the idea that we inherit the constitutions we inhabit and the
conventions, traditions, practices, and mores collected within them. Political
actors work within a framework that is the result of the accumulation of past
materiel (institutions, processes, ideas). We walk onto a stage that is already set
and choose from a set of masks worn by our predecessors. Hume sees this as
inevitable but also on balance a good thing, since he thinks there is nothing
worse than the total dissolution of government. The legal and political gaps
opened by revolutions give space for elites or demagogues to make themselves
master of the people.14 Locke’s social contract theory is problematic, then, not
just because it misrepresents reality but also because it opens itself up to this
revolutionary logic, the most likely end of which is oppression. Hume illumi-
nates a less glamorous path. Constitutional politics is centrally and inescapably
a matter of competing claims of authority and liberty and takes place within a
process of institutional discourse that is largely endogenous or preset in that it
builds out a common stock of principles, practices, and assumptions.
Another way of approaching this idea of the constitution as going concern is
to think about it as a trust network. Trust materializes among people, Philip
Pettit has argued, to the extent that they have beliefs about one another that
make trust a sensible attitude to adopt. Trust survives among people to the
extent that those beliefs prove to be correct. “Trustors identify reasons to trust
others and trustees show that those reasons are good reasons: the trust which
they support is generally not disappointed.”15 This is precisely the sort of
scenario Hume identifies. Authority cannot be ascribed to supposedly natural
sources or to historical ‘moments.’ Rather it rests on a record of at least relative
success and the implicit promise of being able to keep delivering social goods in
future. This is a thoroughly modern account of politics not just in its absence of
a theological or transcendental dimension but also in the way it puts center-
stage the interests of individuals, and by extension the interests of groups
(including the entire nation), in its account of the foundation of political author-
ity and of the way in which government ought rightly to be evaluated.
The idea of the trust network can also illuminate the second theme – the
constitution as a complex whole. Hume emphasized the centrality of social
interrelationships even at the level of the formation of the individual.16 In
relation to morals and politics, Hume’s ultimate goal is for us to enlarge our
14 Hume, supra note 6, at 472.
15 Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 202 (1995).
16 DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 80 (Stephen Buckle
ed., 2007): “The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies,” he wrote, “that scarce
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capacity for mutually adjusted agreement grounded in a socialized and sympa-
thetic reason.17 Friedrich Hayek, drawing on Hume, described the ideal society
as resulting from ‘spontaneous order’. By this, he meant a society not unregu-
lated so much as unguided, or at least not too heavily directed. Political com-
munities are best seen not as something made but as something grown. A good
society is typically one that works with the grain of a conventional patterning of
relations (nomos) and that resists the temptation to control it through too many
regulatory laws (legislation) or reengineer it through constitutional design.18
This is broadly consistent with Hume’s science of politics. To govern a society
through general laws, Hume wrote, “is a work of so great difficulty, that no
human genius, however comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and
reflection, to effect it.” It is only the united “judgments of many,” a science of
prudence, that is capable of doing so. “Experience must guide their labour: Time
must bring it to perfection” through a process of “trials and experiments.”19
This vision of constitutional politics is anything but static. It assumes the
constant evolution of community norms and so presupposes a process of con-
tinual adjustment and readjusting of rights and duties, powers, and obligations.
The process operates on two planes: vertically between government and citizens,
understood as both individuals and groups, and horizontally across those
citizens and groups. Change on the vertical axis is likely to affect horizontal
relations, and vice versa. My trust in government may vary according to the
strategy it adopts in respect of other citizens or groups. Contemporary counter-
terrorism debates offer a good example. Consider the situation in France after
the Charlie Hedbo attack. The French are revisiting not just their security
strategy but also the nature of the right to give offence. The debate shows that
the regulatory question faced by the state goes beyond the question of what
legal relation the state ought to stand in relation to its citizenry. Or rather, it
involves a consideration of the effect a suggested change in the law might
plausibly have on relations between different groups within French society,
and even relations within certain groups. The post-Charlie Hedbo debate, like
similar debates since 9/11 that have constitutive and integrative dimensions,
thus reflects the model suggested in this paper that understands constitutional
any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the
actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent.”
17 ANNETTE C. BAIER, A PROGRESS OF SENTIMENTS: REFLECTIONS ON HUME’S TREATISE 278
(1991).
18 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES
OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY, VOL. I RULES AND ORDER (1982).
19 Hume, supra note 13.
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order ultimately as a dense and complex skein of humanity. Constitutional
political actions are typically polycentric or “many centered.” Like a spider’s
web, each crossing of strands within a constitutional order represents a distinct
center for distributing tensions.20 A change in the law can result in more weight
being placed on one or more of those crossing points and this can have wide-
ranging and not necessarily predictable impact elsewhere.
This leads to the third theme – the constitution as a framework of moral
sentiment. Hume thought that while a polity might originate in power it is public
opinion that guarantees whether a constitution stands or falls: “as FORCE is
always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them
but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded.”21
Hume echoes here that well-known softie Thomas Hobbes, who wrote in
Behemoth that “the power of the mighty hath no foundation but in the opinion
and belief of the people.”22 One might object that such a view is outdated. The
modern state has a vast capacity for force at its disposal – resources beyond the
dreams of its early-modern predecessor, incredible surveillance and intelligence
powers, access to powerful and diverse weapons. And yet, there remains a
kernel of truth to Hume’s position. Recall that his position is one that works
over time. In the end, he suggests, governments will tend to move from force
towards opinion as they look to stabilize themselves. This seems plausible, not
least because it is hard to sustain a regime based on force for a long period,
especially through changes of leadership. In any case, it appears generally
easier to reap the rewards of power from a more pliant population; and people
who are willing to accept commands as authoritative tend to be more pliant than
those who are forced. And the very size and complexity of the modern state
apparatus may make it harder to run things through force for the simple reason
that a ruling group has to win over and keep the loyalty of more people and
more institutions.
The idea of the constitution as a framework of moral sentiment can also be
translated into the language of the trust network, a feature of which is its
transitive quality. If things are going well, we expect trust to build on examples
of trustworthy behavior, likely geared towards some goal or common good.
Where things are going badly, where we no longer believe in an institution or
person’s trustworthiness, trust erodes and with it goes our faith in their capacity
to deliver on expectations. Being an interactive relationship that builds on past
20 Lon L. Fuller, The Form and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARVARD L. REV. 353 (1978).
21 David Hume, Of the First Principles of Government, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL AND
LITERARY, supra note 6, at 32.
22 THOMAS HOBBES, BEHEMOTH, OR THE LONG PARLIAMENT 16 (Stephen Holmes ed., 1990).
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practice and current beliefs in order to project into the future, trust tends to grow
or diminish with use.23 Building trust is, as such, a dynamic process, not least
because past practice (‘tradition’) can be re-evaluated in light of changes in
present behavior or future concerns. Traditions are invented, made and remade
continually in the interests of the present.24 This process can help make a
constitutional order strong despite a multiplicity of voices and interests, as
roots are dug into the community’s half-imagined past. But it also explains a
constitution’s peculiar fragility. A constitution can be destabilized, not just
through sudden explosions of violence, but more gradually and subtly by
inclining too strongly towards either liberty or authority. The first path can
lead to anarchy and eventual autocracy – Hume had in mind the fate of
England’s ‘republican moment’ after the Civil War25 – the second to absolutism
and the prerogative state.26 This negative dimension of the constitution as a
framework of moral sentiment – specifically the idea of a regression of moral
sentiments – was exploited by Edmund Burke, who developed an account of the
contagious feedback loops and destructive possibilities inherent first in relation
to Britain’s proto-imperial involvement in India and later in reflecting on the
Revolution in France.27
Change, Convention, and the Human Rights Act
The themes identified so far – conventions, complex whole, opinion – provide the
structure for the rest of the paper. The focus of enquiry is the constitutional
politics surrounding the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA),28 a
major addition to British law – a leading commentator calls it the “cornerstone
of the new British constitution.”29 It incorporated the European Convention on
23 Pettit, supra note 15, at 210.
24 THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1992).
25 DAVID HUME, VI HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1983) available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/
793.
26 David Hume, Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy, or to a
Republic, in ESSAYS MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY, supra note 6, ch. 7.
27 Edmund Burke, Speech on Fox’s India Bill Dec 1, 1783, in REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN
FRANCE (Frank M. Turner ed., 2004); EDMUND BURKE, LETTERS OF A REGICIDE PEACE (1999).
28 Human Rights Act, 1988, c. 42 (U.K.).
29 VERNON BOGDANOR, THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION ch. 3 (2009).
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Human Rights (ECHR)30 into domestic law, allowing litigants to make claims on
the basis of Convention rights to a much greater extent than had previously been
possible in British courts.
We examine the reception of the HRA by concentrating on a seminal case
and exploring its implications for British constitutional politics. The case is A v.
Home Secretary (2004), or the Belmarsh case, where the Law Lords ruled that a
key part of the government’s post-9/11 terrorism strategy contravened the
ECHR.31 The choice is an obvious one, especially given present concerns.
Belmarsh is the most important case decided under the HRA and now acts as
a locus classicus of British public law. In mediating the demands of public
reason and reason of state through a determination of what government can
do to bend and reshape law in the interests of public safety, the case helped to
define more than any other the contours of the new relationship between public
law and sovereign authority. But in addition the case also directly addressed
questions of legal exclusion and inclusion and fed directly into broader consti-
tutional political debates on human rights and security, radical Islam, and
nationhood.
The Case
The case was brought by a number of foreign nationals who were detained
without charge or trial as suspected terrorists under provisions of the Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. The case addressed two issues. The
first was whether the government’s derogation from the European Convention in
respect of the detention measures was lawful. Article 15 of the Convention
provides for a state to derogate from certain obligations in time of “war or
other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.” The government
invoked this power in order to derogate from Article 5 (the right to liberty) in
respect of the power to detain within the Act. The second issue was whether the
statutory provisions under which the claimants had been detained were strictly
necessary in order to deal with the emergency, as prescribed by Article 15.
By an eight-to-one majority, the Law Lords quashed the derogation order32
and issued a declaration under the Human Rights Act 1998 to the effect that the
30 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, amended by Protocol 3, Sept. 21, 1970, Eur. T.S No. 45, Protocol
5, Dec. 20, 1971, Eur. T.S. No. 55 and Protocol 8, Jan. 1, 1990, Eur. T.S No 118.
31 A v. Home Secretary, [2004] UKHL 56 [hereinafter Belmarsh].
32 Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 (SI 2001/3644).
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2001 Act was incompatible with the Convention. The majority held that, while
the question whether there existed a public emergency was one only the govern-
ment could take, the detention provision was not ‘strictly required’ by the
emergency the government understood the country to be facing when the Act
was passed: it was disproportionate and discriminatory and so unlawful. One
majority judge, Lord Hoffmann, would have gone further in holding the deroga-
tion order unlawful on the basis that there was no “war or other public emer-
gency threatening the life of the nation” within the meaning of Article 15.
The judgment in the Belmarsh case was in line with what the text of the HRA
might be said to require, especially in light of the relevant ECHR jurisprudence.33
The European Court of Human Rights later approved it on that basis.34 To that
extent, the case can be understood as a reflection of the Strasbourg Court’s
typical “cocktail of robustness and timidity” when it comes to hearing chal-
lenges to measures justified on the ground of public emergency.35 The orthodoxy
of the case in terms of the paradigm of European human rights law removes a
potential complicating factor, allowing us to concentrate on the reaction of other
institutions and within the body politic as a whole. For the Belmarsh case was,
like a stone thrown into water, to have a sustained ripple effect. As the story is
quite involved, it is present in somewhat schematic form.
The Aftermath
1. The Belmarsh decision was handed down (December 2004) and had an
immediate impact on public debate.36 It was a big news story.37 Media
coverage was largely supportive of the decision.
33 See, e. g., Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1960–61); Brogan v. United Kingdom,
145-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); Brannigan & McBride v. United Kingdom, 258 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1993); Aksoy v. Turkey 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553 (1996); Sakik v. Turkey, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 662
(1998); Demir v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 88 (2009). HRA, sect. 2 (supra note 32) requires the court to
“take into account” such decisions.
34 A v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 301 (2009).
35 OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS 272 (2006).
36 The narrative really starts earlier, either with the ATCSA itself or with the Strasbourg Court’s
Chahal ruling (see infra note 52), which established the legal framework in which ATCSA was
designed to operate.
37 See, e. g., Terror Detainees Win Lords Appeal, BBC NEWS, Dec. 16, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4100481.stm; Terror Suspects Win Lords Appeal Against
Detention, THE TELEGRAPH, Dec. 16, 2004, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
1479156/Terror-suspects-win-Lords-appeal-against-detention.html.
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2. The government thought about it.38 Legally, it might in principle have
elected not to change much in response to the ruling.39 Under the Human
Rights Act, a declaration of incompatibility imposes no legal duty on the
government to repair a breach of the Convention and does not change the
legal status of the parties to the case.40 But it chose to obey. The Prevention
of Terrorism Act 2005, which brought in the control orders regime to replace
detention provisions, was passed in March 2005.
3. Beneath this surface obedience, it is possible to detect a mixture of strategic
calculation and determination on the government’s. Strategic in that it
increasingly packaged counter-terrorism measures in the language used by
the courts: proportionate response, non-discrimination and so on. It also co-
opted judges into the new mechanisms of control. Determined in that the
new anti-terrorism measures were in a different way as intrusive as the
measures they replaced.41 Belmarsh did not directly lead, then, to a sub-
stantially more liberal counter-terrorism policy – although that which it did
produce tended to be subject to greater legal control.42
4. The government began to argue that the court was obstructing the policy
necessary to protect the nation from terrorist attack.43 After all, the argu-
ment went, the courts were in no position to know the danger and did not
have the capacity to assess it. The government did have the relevant
intelligence, much of which could not be publicly released, and the
38 Indeed, the Home Secretary was under pressure from MPs to make the government’s
position clear: MPs David Hencke & Clare Dyer, Round on Clarke Over Belmarsh Ruling,
Dec. 21, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2004/dec/21/humanrights.
terrorism.
39 Although to do so would have run the risk of an adverse ruling from the European Court of
Human Rights. For the Eur. Ct. H.R.’s position on the HRA, see Burden and Burden v. UK, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1064 (2006). It would in any case have had to repair the damage caused to the
derogation order struck down by in Belmarsh (supra note 31).
40 For critical analysis, see Tom Hickman, Constitutional Dialogue, Constitutional Theories and
the Human Rights Act 1998, PUB. L. 306 (2005).
41 For analysis, see Clive Walker, Keeping Control of Terrorists without Losing Control of
Constitutionalism, 59 STANFORD L. REV. 1395 (2007).
42 For analysis, paying particular attention to the rulings of the lower courts, see Adam
Tomkins, National Security and the Role of the Court: A Changed Landscape? 126 L. Q. REV.
534 (2010).
43 Most notably in Tony Blair PM’s “rules of the game are changing” speech on Aug. 5, 2005,
delivered one month after the 7/7 London bombings. See, e. g., Patrick Wintour, Blair Vows to
Root Out Extremism, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 6, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
politics/2005/aug/06/terrorism.july7.
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expertise to make sense of it.44 The court itself is sometimes receptive to this
argument.45 Its first national security decision after 9/11 had explicitly
accepted its force.46
5. The next series of terrorism cases produced equivocal results. A judgment
delivered by the House of Lords a year after A v. Home Secretary included a
forthright declaration of the repugnance of torture to the common law – and
a rebuke to the Court of Appeal’s rather different, even diffident, response to
the question. Still, the majority took a more pro-government position on
defining the test to be used to decide on the admissibility of evidence that
may have been obtained through torture.47 Further, the Law Lords were
unable to mount a united front when the first challenges to the application
of control orders reached them.48 Clearly, many of the judges did not like
the new policy. But they felt unable (or unwilling) to dismantle it.49 Control
orders were potentially legitimate, they ruled, subject to certain limits and
conditions.50 However, the crucial question of what procedural protections
were necessary for the application of control orders received no clear
response, a lack of clarity that the Law Lords only managed to correct51
under direction from the European Court of Human Rights.52
44 For largely unconvincing criticism of this position, see David Feldman, Human Rights,
Terrorism and Risk: the Roles of Politicians and Judges, PUB. L. 364 (2006).
45 Adam Tomkins, National Security and the Due Process of Law, 64 CURR. LEGAL PROB. 215,
240–43 (2011).
46 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47, where Lord
Hoffmann said: “the recent events in New York and Washington … are a reminder that in
matters of national security, the cost of failure can be high. This seems to me to underline the
need for the judicial arm of government to respect the decisions of ministers of the Crown.” See
also, e. g., R (Corner House Research) v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office, [2008] UKHL 60.
47 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71.
48 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45; Secretary of State for the
Home Department v. MB, [2007] UKHL 46; Secretary of State for the Home Department v. E,
[2007] UKHL 47. For analysis, see Thomas Poole, Courts and Conditions of Uncertainty in Times
of Crisis, PUB. L. 234 (2008).
49 The lack of consistency – most dramatic in relation to Lord Hoffmann – was noted by
commentators at the time: see, e. g., Law Lords Show Who’s in Control, THE TELEGRAPH, Apr. 12,
2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1567905/Law-lords-show-whos-in-control.
html.
50 For detailed analysis, see Gavin Phillipson & Helen Fenwick, Covert Derogations and Judicial
Deference: Redefining Liberty and Due Process Rights in Couterterrorism Law and Beyond, 56
MCGILL L. J. 863 (2011).
51 See Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF (No.3) [2009] UKHL 28.
52 See A v UK, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611 (1999).
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6. In a parallel development, the government sought to revive a strategy of
deporting foreign terrorist suspects. The difficulty it faced was the Chahal
case in which the European Court of Human Rights ruled that deportation
violates the Convention where there is a real risk that the deportee will
suffer torture or inhuman and degrading treatment as a result.53 In this
context, the ruling in practice prevents deportation of a small number of
well-watched individuals. It is unlikely that the direct threat they pose is
considerable. The point seems to be as much one of principle and constitu-
tional politics (who gets to decide?) as genuine policy. The government
often ties this strategy to the general argument noted in point 4, claiming
that the courts are getting in the way of the government’s fundamental duty
to ensure the people’s safety. The game continues, with regular press
reports of frontline skirmishes involving multiple and overlapping appeals
and stratagems to deport.54 Whatever the precise motives of the various
players, it has perhaps done more than anything else to make the HRA
culture in Britain look ridiculous in the eyes of many, a perception that the
three top-selling newspapers in their respective categories of tabloid, mid-
dle-market, and broadsheet – the Sun, the Daily Mail and the Daily
Telegraph – have only been too keen to foster.55
7. A common feature of the post-Belmarsh cases is secrecy. In a sense, this is
nothing new. Secrecy has always been a defining feature of national secur-
ity politics. But the specific argument about the role of special advocates in
control order cases – who are not allowed to interact with those subject to
control orders on whose part they argue in court – spilt over into a wider
debate about the suitability of secret justice (“closed material proceedings”)
in cases where national security is at stake.56 Particular exceptions to
normal practice justified on grounds of emergency have been expanded
into more general (and so apparently more ‘normal’) exceptional practices.
The Justice and Security Act 2013 now requires courts to consider using
53 Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1996).
54 Most notably, involving Abu Qatada. The BBC has produced a useful timeline detailing the
labyrinthine legal process to date, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17769990. The
timeline needs updating to include important events, including Abu Qatada’s eventual deporta-
tion to Jordan in July 2013, his trial, and acquittal in the summer of 2014 on terrorism charges.
55 See, e. g., Ian Loader, The Cultural Lives of Security and Rights, in SECURITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (Benjamin Goold & Liora Lazarus eds., 2007).
56 See, e. g., Binyam Mohamed case (R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign Commonwealth Affairs,
[2008] EWHC 2048; Al Rawi v. The Security Service, [2011] UKSC 34; see also Tariq v. Home
Office, [2011] UKSC 35; Bank Mellat v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, (No. 1) [2013] UKSC 38; Bank
Mellat v. Her Majesty’s Treasure, (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 39.
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closed material proceedings where there is a risk that sensitive material
would be disclosed in the course of the proceedings.57 The effect of using a
CMP is to allow the court to consider any sensitive material without it being
disclosed to the other party in the case, and so constitutes a significant
incursion on principles of equality of arms and open justice that underpin
the adjudicatory process.
8. More generally – a further ripple – the Belmarsh case in particular, but also
the events that it helped set in train, caused great concern among political
actors inside and outside Parliament, not only for the specific reasons noted
in point 4 but on wider constitutional grounds. The key principle of the
British constitution at least used to be parliamentary sovereignty, under-
stood as meaning that Parliament legally had the right to make a final
decision on any matter. The HRA was not intended to lead to the demise
of that principle. But its effect might be said to have significantly eroded
parliamentary sovereignty – at least this is what Belmarsh is often taken to
show. Senior judges have said in other cases that they understand parlia-
mentary sovereignty to operate now in a different way, subordinate at least
in extremis to fundamental constitutional values connected with a substan-
tive conception of the rule of law.58
9. A related point. The constitutional narrative surrounding Belmarsh fed into
another. This saw the Human Rights Act as an alien (“European”) imposi-
tion on a perfectly healthy native (“British”) system. The constitutional
point noted in the previous point here seeps into questions of identity and
destiny that form part of a “debate on Europe” in which the central concern
is the UK’s membership of the EU. This narrative means putting HRA on the
wrong side of the line, as something to do with ‘them’ rather than ‘us’.59
This sentiment may prove fatal to the HRA – at least in its current form –
unless it is checked or reversed.
10. Point 4 (the claim that ‘the courts are compromising security’) combines
with other single-issue narratives (e. g. that the HRA is a ‘charter for
57 Justice and Security Act 2013, Part II, s.6.
58 Jackson v. Attorney-General, [2005] UKHL 56; AXA General Insurance Ltd v. Lord Advocate,
[2011] UKSC 46; R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v. Secretary of State for Transport, [2014] UKSC 3.
See also Bogdanor, supra note 29.
59 See, e. g., the parliamentary and public debate on prisoners’ voting rights in the wake of the
ECtHR decisions in Hirst v. United Kingdom ((No. 2) Eur. Ct. H.R. 681 (2005)) and Scoppola v.
Italy, ((No. 3) Eur. Ct. H.R. 868 (2012)). See Peter Ramsay, Voters Should Not Be in Prison! The
Rights of Prisoners in a Democracy, 16 CRIT. REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. (2013); Danny Nicol,
Legitimacy of the Commons Debate on Prisoner Voting, PUBLIC L. 681 (2011).
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criminals, prisoners, terrorists and immigrants’60) and all of them with
general constitutional points in the last two paragraphs to put very serious
pressure on the HRA.
Analysis
Many observations could be made on the basis of this account of the Belmarsh
plotline. Comments are limited to those that relate to the framework of analysis
developed earlier, specifically to the three themes of convention, complex whole,
and opinion. A v. Home Secretary is an illustration of the conventional patterning
of constitutional change. This is clear from the judgments themselves, which tend
to emphasize more familiar elements by noting their consonance either with a
growing transnational set of norms governing emergency action, most developed
in the framework of European human rights law (e. g., Lord Bingham), or with
deeper strata of British constitutional practice (e. g., Lord Hoffmann). The after-
effects of the case illustrate clearly how major judgments such as Belmarsh are
made sense of in light of existing legal and constitutional structures – and that it
is precisely the process of making such changes fit (and stick) that truly generates
constitutional change.
The case study shows how this process is not just a question of specifics, of
fitting a particular decision within a body of pre-existing law, juridically sig-
nificant though that task might be. Realizing the integrity of public law involves
the reconciliation of various strands of law, principle, and practice.61 The
analysis indicates how political actors and other commentators tend to fold a
case like A v. Home Secretary within a narrative to which meaning – constitutive,
identity-forming, normative – can more easily be ascribed. So, Belmarsh
becomes synonymous with – take your pick – judicial overreach, the invasion
of native politics by a foreign legal culture, or the brave stand of judges against
a manipulative and over-zealous government. The tendency to construct narra-
tives may result from our need to make things manageable by turning them into
stories. It serves as a heuristic. Given earlier observations about constitutions
and trust, it might also be understood as a technique for making visible what is
most at stake in a putative constitutional change in terms of an on-going pattern
of trust relations. Narratives arguably make it easier to isolate a particular
60 On the latter, see, e. g., Lauren McLaren and Mark Johnson, Understanding the Rising Trend
of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, in BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES SURVEY, 21ST REPORT 172 (Alison
Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, Catherine Bromley, & Miranda Phillips eds., 2004).
61 For Ronald Dworkin’s analogous idea of “law as integrity,” see LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
Rights and Opinion 469
change and to ask whether it is likely to have a positive impact on the provision
and guarantee of desired social goods.
Public Opinion and the Human Rights Act
Constitutional narratives are formed largely outside the legal epistemic commu-
nity. Once up and running, they have their own momentum and can have
cascading or spiraling potential. That can be beneficial when a “good” constitu-
tional norm or arrangement is in question, as a cascade of positive narratives
can help embed that change. But narrative momentum can work the other way,
working against the recognition or uptake of a norm or constitutional arrange-
ment. This dimension of the constitutional argument is addressed in this section,
which explores public opinion and the Human Rights Act, a subject that has
received insufficient scholarly attention. We start by tracking the position on the
HRA of the main political parties. Although arguably a declining force within
European politics,62 parties remain important mediators between elite and pop-
ular opinion.
The Conservative Party, the dominant party in the Coalition Government of
2010–15, and now the governing party opposes the HRA. Its opposition has
ranged from the tepid – it abstained on the second reading of the Human
Rights Bill – to the vocal. The Party manifesto going into the 2010 general
election pledged to replace the HRA with a “British Bill of Rights.” Its position
has hardened over the intervening period.63 Their latest proposal is to use the
text of the European Convention in a new British Bill of Rights, while attempting
to reduce the influence of the European Court of Human Rights so as to produce
a more restrained set of rights and a weaker enforcement mechanism. The minor
party in the Coalition government, the Liberal Democrats, is committedly pro-
European and pro-Convention. The Coalition Government set up a Commission
on a Bill of Rights as a means of negotiating the opposed positions of the
coalition parties on the HRA. The Commission’s strange report does little more
than sketch the contemporary scene. Proposals are vague, although a majority
of Commissioners did support a UK Bill of Rights in one form or another. The
Commission did note, though, a lack of popular ownership of the HRA:
62 Although this capacity seems to be on the wane, at least within Europe: See PETER MAIR,
RULING THE VOID: THE HOLLOWING OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY (2013).
63 See, e. g., David Cameron: Scrap the Human Rights Act, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 24, 2007;
CONSERVATIVE PARTY, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UK: THE CONSERVATIVES’ PROPOSALS
FOR CHANGING BRITAIN’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS (2014).
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While polling on these issues is notoriously unreliable … even the most enthusiastic
advocates of the UK’s present human rights structures accept that … there is a lack of
public understanding and ‘ownership’ of the Human Rights Act. If that is true of the
Human Rights Act, these members believe that it is equally, if not even more, evident in
relation to the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights with the result that many people feel alienated from a system that they regard as
‘European’ rather than British. In the view of these members it is this lack of ‘ownership’
by the public which is, in their view, the most powerful argument for a new constitutional
instrument.64
The Belmarsh case and its progeny largely reinforced long-held attitudes
among Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. The position of the Labour
Party has been more varied. Historically antithetical to rights, they were
included in the Party’s platform in the 1990s. However, having enacted the
Human Rights Act in 1998, at least some party leaders became increasingly
hostile to the constitutional culture the Act seemed to have produced. Tony
Blair PM spoke out against it after the July 7 bombings in London, as did a
number of his leading ministers.65 The last Labour Prime Minister, Gordon
Brown, made moves in the direction of a British Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities. Presently, and despite some noises off, it is official party
policy to support the Human Rights Act.66
The most notably new development in British party politics has been the rise
of the UK Independence Party. UKIP supports the abolition of the HRA and
withdrawal from both the European Convention and the European Union.67 The
party’s rise has had a wider impact on the public debate, a feature of which is
the hardening of the final narrative point critical of the HRA outlined in the
previous section. One index of this is the coarsening of the debate on constitu-
tional politics, a phenomenon visible in the way that many politicians, even at
the highest level, have criticized the human rights judgments of British courts –
even more so in the way in which many political actors, including senior judges,
routinely criticize the European Court of Human Rights. This is part of a “new
era of vulgarity” in British constitutional politics, Conor Gearty argues. “The
64 THE COMMISSION ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, A UK BILL OF RIGHTS? THE CHOICE BEFORE US, para.
80 (2012).
65 See, e. g., Neil Temko & Jamie Doward, Revealed: Blair Attack on Human Rights Law, THE
OBSERVER, May 14, 2006.
66 See, e. g., Nigel Morris, Labour Party Conference: Sadiq Kahn Vows to Put Human Rights at
Heart of General Election Campaign, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 24, 2014.
67 UKIP garnered 27% of the votes at the 2014 European elections, returning more MEPs than
any other political party. At the time of writing, opinion polls polling show UKIP at around
15% (compared with 34% for Labour, 32% Conservative and 8% Lib Dem): THE OBSERVER,
Feb. 8, 2015.
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extraordinary way in which our public culture has been mustered to savage the
Strasbourg court is one of the dismal wonders of our politically constricted
age.”68
But to what extent does the hostility to the Human Rights Act, as reflected in
UKIP policy and fostered by certain influential newspapers (see above), reflect
the opinions of the public more broadly? Certainly, the advocates of a Private
Members’ Bill – a legislative proposal introduced by MPs who are not govern-
ment ministers – in 2013 to repeal the HRA think that it does. The sponsor of the
Bill, Charlie Elphicke, claimed during the parliamentary debate that human
rights were “in crisis today, with a substantial majority of the British people
regarding human rights as a charter for criminals and the undeserving.”69 A
“new settlement” was needed, he said, “to restore trust and confidence in
human rights – a settlement that works for Britain.”70 Elphicke and his suppor-
ters had no hesitation in naming the HRA as the cause of the current discontent,
claiming that it had “without doubt, transformed human rights in the UK in
ways that are wholeheartedly rejected by the British people.”71
It is difficult to say whether such claims are accurate. Little polling data is
available or much by way of empirically informed analysis on the HRA and
public opinion. The issue also raises more general questions about what people
know about law and the constitution and what they expect from it. Let us try,
though, to make something with what is available. There are a small number of
opinion polls that shed light on different aspects of the question. First, there is
the YouGov/ITV poll of 2456 British adults conducted in March 2011.72 The survey
asked three questions. To the question ‘do you think that human rights laws are
good for British justice?’ 22% said good, 51% bad, 18% neither good nor bad,
and 9% didn’t know. To the question ‘do you agree that everyone should have
their rights protected, even if they have broken the law?’ 31% said yes and 64%
no. To the last question asking whether respondents thought the HRA was being
overused, 75% thought that it was being overused, 4% underused, 12% said it
was being used about right, and 9% didn’t know. Taken in isolation, the survey
would seem to indicate that public opinion has gone the same direction as much
68 Conor Gearty, On Fantasy Island: British Politics, English Judges and the European Convention
on Human Rights, The Corbishley Lecture (Nov. 7, 2014).
69 Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal and Substitution) Bill, House of Commons, Hansard, 1 Mar.
2013: Column 574.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 YOUGOV/ITV (2011), available at http://cdn.yougov.com/today_uk_import/yg-archives-pol-
yougovitv-humanrights-240311.pdf.
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of the press coverage of the HRA – a majority hostile to (or at least critical of) the
Act, but a substantial minority that is broadly supportive.73
A second survey, conducted by Ipsos/MORI as part of their ‘Audit of Public
Engagement’ in March 20074 asked a series of questions concerning public
understanding of the HRA and public approval of the HRA. In response to the
question ‘how well do you understand the way the HRA works in practice?’ only
29% said ‘well’ and just 5% ‘very well’. To the question ‘how well do you
understand the issues relating to whether Britain needs a Bill of Rights?’ 23%
said well and 5% very well. As to the question ‘are you satisfied with the way
the HRA works in practice?’ 2% were very satisfied, 22% fairly satisfied, 21%
fairly dissatisfied and 10% very unsatisfied. Many respondents replied to this
question either ‘neither/no’ (32%) or ‘don’t know’ (13%). The way the HRA
works in practice was the constitutional issue respondents thought most
urgently in need of change (26%) – above, for instance, the funding of political
parties (24%) and Britain’s membership of the EU (23%). In response to the
question ‘are you satisfied in Britain not having a Bill of Rights?’ 4% said very
satisfied, 15% fairly satisfied, 12% fairly dissatisfied and 6% very dissatisfied.
(42% answered ‘neither/nor’ and 21% ‘don’t know’.) In its analysis of the Audit,
the Hansard Society – a well-known political research and education charity –
notes further that the HRA is an issue that has exercised parts of the press. The
survey showed that “the balance of opinion is slightly more towards satisfied
among quality newspaper readers, and slightly more towards dissatisfied among
readers of tabloid newspapers.”75 The issue scored highly as one of the most
urgent issues for reform, among readers of both quality and tabloid
newspapers.76
A third poll, the ComRes Liberty Human Rights Poll,77 surveyed 1007 adults
in September 2011. Unlike the other two, this poll asked respondents about their
attitudes to rights and the law in Britain more generally. In reply to the question
‘how important do you think it is that there is a law protecting rights and
73 The survey also revealed a fair amount of regional and age-related diversity of opinion, with
those living in London (and Scotland and Wales) and young adults being more favorable to the
HRA.
74 IPSOS/MORI, AUDIT OF POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 5 (2008), available at http://www.ipsos-mori.
com/researchpublications/researcharchive/162/Audit-of-Political-Engagement-5.aspx.
75 HANSARD SOCIETY, AUDIT OF POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 5, 31 (2008).
76 Id. See also Mark Johnson & Conor Gearty, Civil Liberties and the Challenge of Terrorism, in,
BRITISH SOCIAL ATTITUDES: 23RD REPORT – PERSPECTIVES ON A CHANGING SOCIETY ch. 7
(A. Park, C. Curtice, K. Thomson, M. Phillips, & M. Johnson eds., 2007).
77 Available at http://www.comres.co.uk/polls/Liberty_HRA_Tracker_Public_Poll_Sept_
2011.pdf.
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freedoms in Britain?’ 65% said very important, 29% fairly important, 3% fairly
unimportant and 4% very unimportant. Similar results were recorded for more
specific questions relating to the right not to be tortured, the right not to be
detained without reasons, the right to a fair trial, freedom of thought, conscience
and religion, the right to privacy, family life and the home, freedom of speech,
protest and association, and the right to property. In all cases, the net vital/
important/useful score was in the 90s (one was 89) and the net vital/important
score in the 80s. The campaign group Liberty was clearly pleased with the
results of its poll. Its Director Shami Chakrabati said, taking aim at the
Conservative Party, “Why put your party at odds with 93 per cent of people
polled who value human rights protection in this country?”78
What are we to make of this material? I am reluctant to ignore it, as the
Commission on a Bill of Rights did. The surveys provide rare glimpses into
public attitudes on matters that we, as scholars and advocates, can sometimes
be too invested in to have a clear sense of where trends of opinion are heading.
Let us take the last one (ComRes) first. Can it be written off as a stunt organized
by a pressure group asking motherhood and apple pie questions? Perhaps. But
the poll has been repeated twice since 2011, producing very similar results.79
And its findings are broadly supported by another study, undertaken by the
British Social Attitudes survey, which reinforces the impression that political
freedoms are, on the whole, consistently highly valued by the public. Based
on a sample set of over 4,000 cases, that survey found that the right to protest
against government and the right to trial by jury for serious crimes were valued
as important by respondents (64% and 88% respectively).80 The high percen-
tages in both these studies seem to indicate something important about legal/
political sensibilities: that people value legal guarantees of (certain) rights and
expect there to be legal protection of those rights. The British Social Attitudes
survey also indicates that these figures are fairly robust over an extended time
period (in the case of the survey, a 20 year period from 1985–2005).
What, then, about the second (Ipsos/MORI) survey? This strikes me as
perhaps the most credible of the three, in part at least because it separates out
78 “Dog whistles, bogus cats and what the public really think about human rights” (Oct. 4,
2011), available at https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/press-releases/dog-whistles-
bogus-cats-and-what-public-really-think-about-human-rights.
79 See Liberty Human Rights Tracker, available at http://www.comres.co.uk/polls/liberty-
human-rights-tracker/.
80 National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey 2007. For analysis, see
Johnson & Gearty, supra note 76. It is fair to say, however, that certain other rights appear to be
less highly valued, perhaps most notably the right not to be held by police without access to a
solicitor.
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questions of understanding and satisfaction. The picture that comes out of it is
equivocal. Levels of understanding are pretty low, but not disastrously so (some
other areas of the British constitution and its politics fared worse). Satisfaction
scores were fairly even – 24% net support versus 31% net unfavorables – but
with a lot of respondents (45%) effectively neutral. The first (YouGov) survey sits
almost at the opposite end of the spectrum from the ComRes/Liberty poll. The
HRA’s unfavorables here are consistently high. Could it be that the dates at
which the surveys were undertaken may explain some of the difference? The
Ipsos/MORI survey dates from 2008, the YouGov poll from 2011. If so, the two
polls in conjunction may show a hardening of public attitudes to the HRA. (The
ComRes survey, also of 2011, did not ask directly about attitudes to the HRA.)
Beyond this, the most interesting response for me is the very high percentage
(75%) of respondents who agreed that the HRA was being used too widely to
create rights it was never intended to protect.
We can make some tentative observations. First, there may be a disjunction
between elite (legal) opinion and that of the populace at large. Even the HRA’s
supporters recognize this. ‘Despite its general popularity among lawyers, the
HRA did not in its first decade succeed in achieving broad political appeal and
its future remains uncertain.’81 Second, while there may well be near consensus
support for the values embedded in the European Convention, people remain
unconvinced (to put it mildly) that the HRA is the right vehicle for articulating
those values. The Act has “distinctly failed to build up any intellectual or
political head of steam.”82 Third, one of the reasons why this might be so is a
level of general satisfaction (or, more accurately, lack of dissatisfaction) with
existing constitutional arrangements.83 As two leading American commentators
put it, “it is a land in which self-satisfaction about the rights of Englishmen
under common law has dampened ideological concerns for independent guar-
antees of private rights.”84 Stripped of the pejorative language, we might say
that the public, by and large, are unconvinced about the need to change a
81 STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 156 (2013).
82 Conor Gearty, Beyond the Human Rights Act, in 2 THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
472 (Tom Campbell, K D Ewing, & Adam Tomkins eds., 2011).
83 Although not, at least in some quarters, with the existing British state: the independence
referendum in Scotland resulted in a 55–45 ‘no’ vote. A poll of 2,047 voters (by Lord Ashcroft
Polls) revealed that 71% of those age 16–17 and 59% of those age 25–34 voted yes. Available at
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/20/scottish-independence-lord-ashcroft-poll.
84 MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION 156 (2002).
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system that they regard as basically fit for the purpose.85 Finally, we might add
that a sense of uncertainty and disagreement about a new and significant
constitutional innovation is probably to be expected, and is not necessarily a
bad thing. Examples abound, but staying with Britain we might recall the
intense disagreement surrounding the Reform Acts that widened the franchise
both at the time they were passed and in the years that followed.86
Constitutional change necessitates periods of adjustment, perhaps all the more
so in the absence of genuine crisis moments (the end of civil war, revolution)
where the need for constitutional change is likely to present itself as a necessity.
Stepping back a little, we can present three alternative models of what is
going on. The first, the ‘Catch Up’ or ‘Delayed Reaction’ model, would suggest
that what we are seeing is a straightforward and relatively common occurrence
of popular opinion taking time to catch up with elite opinion.87 In time, enough
people will adjust their normative horizons to include the new phenomenon. I
suspect that many British public lawyers intuitively subscribe to something like
this view. It is not implausible. The longer the HRA survives the more likely that
it will prove correct. It does, though, tend to view the populace as passive
agents. There is not too much support for this model in the data – but the
model can explain this away. (‘They will get there in the end. You will see!’) It
would be problematic for the model if the 2008 and 2011 surveys really do reveal
a rise in hostility to the HRA. The trend should be going the other way.88 It also
does not assist this model that elite opinion is itself divided on the HRA.
The second, or ‘Creative Tension’, model starts by acknowledging the dis-
agreement that still surrounds the HRA. Such a polarized reaction is to be
expected in response to a major constitutional innovation. After all, the demos
is not a flock of sheep to be led wherever elites decide but represent an active
force in constitutional politics. The model predicts that this tension will likely be
resolved on the side of the constitutional innovation – not least because it swims
with general and international trends – but perhaps also that that innovation
will have to adjust first to the expectations of the people, or of powerful interests
85 A similar argument is made, with significant success, in Australia, another common law
country without a national Bill of Rights.
86 Walter Bagehot’s famous account of the British political system, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION
(first serialized in The Fortnightly Review and later published in book form in 1867), needs to be
read in light of the debates over – and fears concerning – the Reform Act of 1867.
87 This model has at least something in common with Schumpeterian democratic theory, see
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (2010).
88 Security concerns might arguably have receded a little over the period; but other concerns
seem to have risen – e. g. immigration and border control – which complicates things from the
pro-HRA position.
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within them. In respect of the opinion data, the model can account for both the
strong general sentiments expressed in favor of legal rights guarantees (ComRes)
and the negative views of the HRA expressed in the YouGov and Ipsos/MORI
polls – and to a certain extent also the large percentages of neutrals and ‘don’t
knows’ in the Ipsos/MORI poll and the British Social Attitudes Survey. It can also
accommodate the evidence of polarized opinions not just in the data but also in
the media debate. A harder fit is the downward trend (if that is what we are
seeing) in positive approval of the HRA.
The third model, “Constitutional Failure,” reads the data as indicating a
fairly simple story of failure. An attempt by an elite to introduce a significant
measure of reform has been rejected by the public at large (and/or by sub-
groups within the elite). This model can account for the variation between the
ComRes on one hand and the two other polls on the other. The former expresses
support for the constitutional status quo (minus the HRA); the latter hostility to
the constitutional innovation (the HRA). It would also highlight the trend
reflected in the 2008 Ipsos/MORI and 2011 YouGov polls. What we are seeing,
this model suggests, is a story of decline. The HRA is the constitutional equiva-
lent of a dead man walking.89
Conclusion: A Progress of Sentiments?
This paper is not a study in constitutional failure. It is, though, a study of a
stable constitution in flux. Drawing on Hume, the paper suggested that there is
value in looking at constitutions politics through three core ideas: conventions,
complex whole, and opinion. Constitutional modifications work well once
folded into the conventional structure of norms and practices – when they
become themselves like conventions. The analysis cautions against having too
high expectations that even a major legal change like the introduction of the
Human Rights Act will produce immediate benefits in terms of minority accom-
modation, at least in an established and functional constitutional order. The
Belmarsh case study indicates how hard it can be to make sustained progress in
89 Although the demise of the Human Rights Act would represent, in a sense, the beginning
rather than the end of the story as the question would become what next? What would be the
role for a common law unquestionably “beefed up” normatively after 15 years of direct exposure
to the European Convention? See, e. g., Kennedy v. The Charity Commission, [2014] UKSC 20.
What, if anything, would replace the HRA – a British Bill of Rights? And, if so, how different
would such an Act be in practice? And what about the UK’s involvement in the European
Convention system?
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building a legal framework capable of protecting minority groups in an unpro-
pitious political climate. Yet, it also shows how even apparent gains accrued
through litigation begin to look shallow or even counterproductive if they do not
also lead to a change at the level of popular opinion.
Extrapolating a little, my sense is that change may be slower in relation to
attitudes to the constitution than on more general political matters. It may also
be the case that constitutional changes are harder to make stick in our age of
fluidity and instability, as people’s need for stability increases. Perhaps we need
to moderate the way we tend to think about change. We often appeal to three
sources of authority: legislation (authority), natural law (reason), and enligh-
tened self-interest (sentiment). All these elements must, I suppose, form part of
the equation. But if Bagehot was right in thinking that men are governed by the
weakness of their imaginations, then we should pay more attention to the
imaginations of our fellow citizens, and their limits, aiming to enlarge our
moral horizons in a way that aligns them with what is best within existing
structures of practice and belief. It may be time to recapture the idea of con-
stitutional change as being connected to the progress of sentiments.
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